Purpose -This paper investigates the impact and techniques for mitigating the effects of web robots on usage statistics collected by Open Access institutional repositories (IRs). Design/methodology/approach -A review of the literature provides a comprehensive list of web robot detection techniques. Reviews of system documentation and open source code are carried out along with personal interviews to provide a comparison of the robot detection techniques used in the major IR platforms. An empirical test based on a simple random sample of downloads with 96.20% certainty is undertaken to measure the accuracy of an IR's web robot detection at a large Irish University. Findings -While web robot detection is not ignored in IRs, there are areas where the two main systems could be improved. The technique tested here is found to have successfully detected 94.18% of web robots visiting the site over a two-year period (recall), with a precision of 98.92%. Due to the high level of robot activity in repositories, correctly labelling more robots has an exponential effect on the accuracy of usage statistics. Limitations -This study is performed on one repository using a single system. Future studies across multiple sites and platforms are needed to determine the accuracy of web robot detection in OA repositories generally. Originality/value -This is the only study to date to have investigated web robot detection in IRs. It puts forward the first empirical benchmarking of accuracy in IR usage statistics.
Introduction
Usage metrics are commonly used in library and information service environments to assist with decision making such as journal purchasing, collection building, and item deselection, and to demonstrate the overall value of the services themselves. Scholarly Open Access (OA) repositories, freely accessible full text repositories of scientific and scholarly publications, are one such service within the higher education and research information sector. Beginning around 1991 with arXiv.org, the electronic pre-print archive of papers in physics and similar subjects (Cornell University Library, n.d.), the number of OA repositories has grown to more than 4,000 worldwide in 2015 (University of Southampton and EPrints.org, n.d.) . Many of these repositories are hosted locally by universities for selfarchiving by the academic and research staff of those institutions and are known within the community as institutional repositories (IRs).
As with other information services, OA repositories often collect usage statistics for the items they host, typically as full text download counts. Opinions on download statistics are somewhat divided, with some arguing that they are problematic and unhelpful (Cornell University Library, n.d.) , while others make free use of download statistics, ranking papers and even authors, distributing them monthly to participants, and advertising them broadly to the public (Gordon and Jensen, n.d., Zimmerman and Baum, n.d.) . Download statistics have even been shown under certain conditions to be predictors of future citations (Brody et al., 2006) , arguably the most important metric for scholarly and scientific research publications.
Regardless of which stance one takes, any data used as a metric or simply publicised for promotional purposes must be accurate in order to be useful and credible. A great challenge to this in any web environment is the use of web robots, operated by search engines and comment spammers alike, and accounting for between 8.51% and 32.6% of web traffic (Doran and Gokhale, 2011) . Robot traffic can vary widely depending on the type of web site, with a study on the Internet Archive finding as much as 93% of requests attributable to robots (AlNoamany et al., 2013) .
Given the importance of accurate usage statistics, the sizable and widely variable impact of web robots, and the complexity of detecting them, we endeavor to answer the following questions: What techniques are commonly used for web robot detection? How do the main institutional repository software packages implement web robot detection out-of-the-box? We then describe and test a web robot detection technique used in practice by an OA institutional repository at a large Irish University and discuss an effective and practical approach to web robot detection for repositories that takes advantage of the theoretical models.
Web robot detection techniques
A close review of the existing literature on web robot detection yielded ten individual studies (Tan and Kumar, 2002 , Geens et al., 2006 , Huntington et al., 2008 , Duskin and Feitelson, 2009 , Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009 , Doran and Gokhale, 2012 , AlNoamany et al., 2013 , Song et al., 2013 , Lamothe, 2014 , Zabihi et al., 2014 and one overview/review article (Doran and Gokhale, 2011 ) that describe and test the main techniques and data used in web robot detection. Table 1 lists 23 distinct variables used in these studies, categorised here according to a simplified version of the schema proposed by Doran and Gokhale (2011) . While the majority come from the field of computer science, three studies were found that focus on scholarly information systems (Bollen and Sompel, 2006 , Huntington et al., 2008 , Lamothe, 2014 .
None of these studies benchmark detection techniques used in an Open Access repository, though Huntington et al.'s research on an Open Access journal (2008) is very closely related in terms of the content. The technique of investigating outliers in library e-resource usage data proposed by Lamothe (2014) is similar not only in content, but also in terms of the technique, which is nearly identical with one of the techniques used by the repository investigated in this study.
Simplified Doran and Gokhale classification (2011)

Data used in robot detection
Number of studies Syntactic log analysis User agent string 6 1, 4, 5, 9, 11 robots.txt access 5 1, 4, 5, 8, 9 List of known robot IP addresses 3 Volume of requests 5 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 Duration of session 3 5, 8, 11 Interval between requests 3 3,4,9
Percent image requests 3 4, 8, 9 Resource type requests 3 2,9,11
Image:html ratio 2 Other studies (Doran & Gokhale, 2011) Each study presents a different method for analyzing the data, from matching data in the server logs against known robots (Huntington et al., 2008) to complex machine learning techniques (Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009, Tan and Kumar, 2002) . What is immediately clear is that no method is capable of accurately detecting all robots visiting a given web server. The stated goal of robot detection becomes to detect the highest percentage of all robots (recall) with the lowest number of false positives (precision), that is, capturing as many robots as possible while labelling the fewest number of human sessions as robots (Geens et al., 2006) . Best combined method. F-score shown here is calculated from recall and precision as given in the publication using F = 2(PR/(P+R)) (Olson and Delen, 2008) ; not reported directly by Geens et al. 3 Highest F-score reported by Stassopoulou & Dikaiakos (classifier 3) 4 Mean of recall, precision, and F-score of all 5 classifiers listed in the study shown here; not reported directly by Stassopoulou & Dikaiakos 5 F-score calculated from recall and precision as given in the publication using F = 2(PR/(P+R)) (Olson and Delen, 2008) ; not reported directly by Tan & Kumar  Table 2 . Results of robot detection studies
In order to test a robot detection technique, researchers must first know "exactly which sessions in the log file were created by robots" (Geens et al., 2006) . This often involves checking and labelling the data manually (Huntington et al., 2008 , Geens et al., 2006 , though often, due to the size of the dataset, robots in the test data are labelled automatically or semi-automatically (Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009 , Tan and Kumar, 2002 , Zabihi et al., 2014 using reliable detection techniques different from the ones being tested. Doran and Gokhale (2012) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of manually versus automatically generated test sets. On the one hand, "there is a reasonable guarantee" that a manually generated test set is correctly labelled, however, manual labelling risks including only a narrow and nonrepresentative selection of robots that would normally crawl the server (Doran and Gokhale, 2012) (p. 9) . On the other hand, they argue that there is no reason to assume an automatically generated test set is correctly labelled. To overcome the problem, the authors devise a method to test the test data (pp. 9-10).
This somewhat paradoxical situation is compounded by an interesting feature of some studies that Doran and Gokhale (2012) point out (p. 9) and make efforts to avoid, that of the use of expert (human) opinion in robot detection and testing (Bollen and Sompel, 2006 , Song et al., 2013 , Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009 ).
The fallibility and inconsistency of expert opinion, the paradoxical nature of technique testing, and the final results of various detection studies (as seen in Table 2 ) suggest that absolute certainty in robot detection is very likely an unrealistic goal. Cast more positively, many studies clearly note that detection techniques should be multi-modal, making use of a variety of data and techniques to arrive at a bestpossible result (Doran and Gokhale, 2011 , Duskin and Feitelson, 2009 , Geens et al., 2006 .
Robot detection techniques used in Open Access institutional repositories
In our experience, institutional repository content is most often discovered via the major search engines, a direct and positive result of robotic indexing. This supports the claim that "discovery happens elsewhere" (Dempsey, 2007) and has implications for web robot detection in OA repositories. On the one hand, repositories by nature wish to attract search engines in order to increase the visibility and discoverability of their content; however, they must present accurate usage statistics that have nonhuman usage filtered out. Since repositories cannot simply exclude robots altogether (and this would probably be impossible), they must develop practical web robot detection techniques that can stay apace of robot development.
To some degree the lack of discovery occuring within the actual repository site itself sets them apart from the detection studies listed above. Session data beyond the initial download request is limited or non-existent; a session in a repository often consists of a single direct bitstream (file) download with neither leading click-stream nor trailing lateral browsing. The only available trace in the logs may be limited to the date and time, the HTTP method and response code, and the IP address, user agent string, and referring website. It is not unusual for many of these fields to be left blank.
If this is generally true, then many of the robot detection techniques listed in Table 1 , such as requests for web page components, image:html ratios, and resource type requests are of limited or no use in repositories. The lack of interaction with the site rules out the use of real-time techniques such as mouse movements and key clicks. CAPTCHA could limit the discoverability of open resources since they are usually intended to deny access to robots. A list of robot detection techniques that remain relevant to repositories is put forward and the techniques used by the main OA repository systems are compared in Table 3 . Bearing in mind their mostly non-commercial nature, open source community based development, and unique usage patterns, the web robot detection techniques used in these systems are described in detail below. Data available as a configurable report for manual decision making Table 3 . Robot detection techniques used in institutional repository systems
DSpace EPrints Digital Commons
Minho
DSpace
DSpace, first released in 2002 (Smith et al., 2003) , is used by over 1,608 institutions and is the most used institutional repository system worldwide (University of Southampton and EPrints.org, n.d.). DSpace collects usage statistics using Apache SOLR and has included web robot filtration since 2010 (Diggory and Luyten, 2015b) .
DSpace has functionality to detect robots using three methods. It first checks the user agent string for each download and page view against a list of 235 known user agent patterns (regular expressions).
Next it checks the IP address against lists of six large search engines' IP addresses, one list of 2,528 other known search engines' IP addresses, and one list of 48 robots not associated with search engines. Most of these IP address lists can be automatically updated via web queries. Finally, the detector does a reverse DNS name lookup for the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) and matches against a list of domains of known robots (Van de Velde and Diggory, 2015) .
Unfortunately, robot detection in DSpace seems to have suffered a certain amount of neglect: at the time of this writing, the IP address lists have not been updated in nearly six years (since February 2010).
The list of user agent strings was last updated in April 2015. The list of domain names includes only ten patterns so could be viewed more as a functionality or potential/experimental robot detection method rather than an actual method used in practice. There are notable omissions in both the IP address list and the user agents, for example Bingbot (Diggory and Luyten, 2015a) . Though Bingbot would match against the regular expression "bot" in DSpace's agent list, this points to a key problem with relying on lists of known robots: they must be kept up to date to be effective, furthermore, they are easily circumvented (Doran and Gokhale, 2011) . In DSpace, robot detection is almost completely static and badly behaved robots will almost never be detected. The need for improvements to the usage statistics system has however been discussed as recently as 2014 (DSpace Community Advisory Team and Luyten).
EPrints
EPrints is the longest running repository platform, started prior to 2002 (EPrints.org and University of Southampton, n.d.). It is the second most prevalent repository platform, in use by at least 578 institutions (University of Southampton and EPrints.org, n.d.). EPrints includes a usage statistics module called IRStats 2 that includes web robot detection (Field, 2015) .
IRStats filters downloads based on two principles. The first is a list of 960 user agent strings (regular expressions) of known robots or crawler software. If the user agent string recorded in the EPrints access database matches any of these, the download is not counted. The second filter checks how often a single IP address downloads distinct items; by default if it downloads an item more than once in a 24 hour period, only one download is counted towards that item for that period. The stated goal of this filter is "to detect so-called double-click downloads" (François, 2015) .
The repeat download filter is an interesting application of the volume of requests technique. It is not robot detection in the strictest sense (and is not advertised as such) since it intentionally allows some downloads to be reported as legitimate despite having been (very likely correctly) detected as robot downloads. At least one robot download per item per 24 hours is allowed by the filter, and if the same robot downloads every item in a repository once in a single day, all of these downloads will be counted as legitimate. Still, the filter no doubt greatly limits the effect of robots that could only be detected this way, and does so without manual intervention.
Logically this method will result in a number of false negatives (unfiltered robot downloads). False positives (human downloads discounted as robots) are also a potential side-effect due to factors such as network address translation (NAT). This results in a forced trade-off between recall and precision: the shorter the timeout period, the more false negatives (reducing recall); the longer the timeout, the higher the false positives (reducing precision).
The NAT problem, where many users on one network appear to be using a single IP address, has been queried by at least one user of the EPrints system (Joint et al., 2011) , but only an empirical test can determine the impact of the repeat download filter's algorithm on the accuracy of download statistics in EPrints.
The user agent filter in EPrints is static and will not detect badly behaved robots. Since it is not intended to detect robots (though it probably does, and is a legitimate detection technique), the repeat download filter is a missed opportunity for basic machine learning, since it never records the IP addresses or user agent strings of the agents that it detects. This means that a robot that EPrints correctly identifies today (albeit accidentally) could be completely ignored tomorrow.
Digital Commons
Digital Commons is a hosted institutional repository platform, with 400 participating institutions (Digital Commons, n.d.-c). All Open Access articles hosted on a Digital Commons institutional repository are discoverable through a single system known as the Digital Commons Network, which consists of more than 1.5 million Open Access works (Digital Commons, n.d.-a).
Since Digital Commons is a centrally managed network of repositories, robot detection is carried out across a much larger dataset than any single repository. The size of the dataset affords a view of user behavior that would not be possible at a local institutional repository, and any rule applied to one repository's data is applied to all. This results in comparable COUNTER compliant download statistics across all sites (Digital Commons, n.d.-b).
The robot detection technique used by Digital Commons consists of a number of filters. Downloads from known robots declared in the user agent string are all discounted, as are download requests that result in a HTTP response code other than 200 or 302. The referrer field is checked for automatically generated URLs, for example a referring URL that is identical to the URL of the requested resource. 
University of Minho Statistics Add-on for DSpace
The Minho Statistics Add-on for DSpace, first built in 2006, is an open source statistics system that integrates with and runs parallel to DSpace. The system was originally designed to promote the University of Minho's institutional repository and show the worldwide usage of archived documents (Carvalho, 2010) . The system also provides comprehensive workflow and administrative statistics.
The Minho Stats Add-on stores every bitstream download (PDF or other file format) in the DSpace database. The system takes a multi-faceted approach to robot detection including matching against a pre-populated list of 793 known agents, detecting accesses to a decoy web page, and accesses to the site's robots.txt file. The database contains related tables of IP addresses and user agent strings (in addition to the pre-populated agents list) that have been previously identified as robots through log analysis. Downloads found to be robots are labelled and discounted from the download figures presented to end users.
To label downloads, a robot detection script reads the server log file and checks each request to see if the IP address and/or the agents are in the database. If the exact agent string is found in the database, any new IP addresses using that user agent string are flagged as potential robots. If neither the IP address nor the exact user agent string is found, the script checks whether the agent matches the prepopulated agent list or if the request was for the decoy web page or robots.txt. If any of these conditions are true, the new IP/agent pair is recorded and all downloads from the flagged IP addresses from a given date forward are discounted from the download totals, pending a manual decision (Dantas and Miranda, 2012) . Figure 1 describes this decision tree. In addition to the robot detection script, the Minho add-on provides an administrative interface that identifies IP addresses with an access frequency of less than one minute, with more than 10 hits, and with a high number of sessions (Dantas and Miranda, 2008) . Lists of the most frequent IP addresses can also be viewed for any period of time. These tools can be used in combination to make manual decisions on an individual IP address basis, which can then be added to the database using a Bash script.
There are two important points to note about the Minho robot detection script. Once an IP address is labelled as originating from a robot, it is added to a near permanent black-list. If the IP address is reused later by a human user, it will still be discounted from the download totals. There is only limited functionality to remove an IP address from the blacklist. This is problematic at least in theory due to the constant recycling of IP addresses by the dynamic host control protocol (DHCP). This issue will be addressed further below.
Secondly, a user agent string that has been associated with a robot IP address will cause any new IP addresses using that user agent to be flagged as a robot. This includes legitimate human user agent strings forged by robots or an agent string belonging to a human user accessing the robots.txt file. The problem is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the match must be exact to the letter, so in the example UA string, "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16," any change in the version numbering for the operating system, browser, rendering engine, etc. will prevent a match and the IP address will not be flagged as a robot. Since these numbers change constantly, the exact UA string for human users will most likely be phased out over time.
Despite the wide array of statistics and the attention paid to web robot detection, the Minho add-on suffers from a severe lack of API and code-level documentation Miranda, 2008, Dantas and Miranda, 2012) . Usage statistics are recorded in the database, as opposed to the much more efficient Solr index used by the DSpace native usage statistics system (Diggory and Luyten, 2015b) ; removing robots and re-aggregating the statistics can take many hours and is very costly in terms of system resources (CPU, RAM, and database connections). In our experience, there are countless coding errors that require many hours of debugging, especially in the SQL that produce usage statistics. Fortunately, the vast majority of SQL is encoded in a single XML file and can be manipulated without searching and recompiling the code. To detect robots, IRUS-UK uses a combination of the COUNTER robots list, consisting of 241 user agent patterns (regular expressions) of known robots (COUNTER, 2015) , and a set of thresholds to limit the number of "overactive" IP addresses. These thresholds were initially set to filter out all downloads from IP addresses that made more than 200 downloads in a single day across all participating repositories (excluding known proxies), and most downloads from IP addresses that made more than 100 downloads in a day (again excluding known proxies) (IRUS-UK, 2013). The thresholds have since been reset to a maximum of 40 downloads per day from any IP address (P. Needham, personal communication, December 2015) . IRUS-UK has also commissioned a study to investigate strengthening their web robot detection techniques (Information Power Ltd., 2013).
IRUS-UK
IRUS-UK (Institutional Repository Usage Statistics UK) is a national service that aggregates, processes, and disseminates usage statistics from (to date) 91 institutional repositories across the UK (IRUS-UK, 2015). IRUS-UK bases its processes on the COUNTER-PIRUS Code of Practice in order to
Benchmarking a robot detection technique used in an Open Access institutional repository at a large Irish University
The institutional repository at University College Dublin (UCD) collects usage statistics using the University of Minho Statistics Add-on for DSpace (version 4 for DSpace 1.8.2). Download statistics are visible in the item record of each paper and at each level of the collection hierarchy from a dedicated subsection of the website. Individual statistical reports are sent automatically each month to every author that has uploaded a paper to the repository. Reports are occasionally provided to Schools and research centres in the university and are often used by them in formal quality reviews.
The importance of the usage statistics, both as indicator of the effectiveness and value of the service, and as a service itself, raises the following questions: How successful is the robot detection technique used at this repository? How accurate are the alleged human download statistics given to end-users? The study may be able to shed light on the effect an IP address-based permanent blacklist (the DHCP problem) has in terms of human downloads classified as robots (false positives).
Description of the detection technique in use
At UCD, the Minho robot detection script runs nightly. New robots are labelled and aggregated in the download database weekly. Anything flagged by the robot detection script is assumed to be a robot. There are currently 49,556 IP addresses and 1,086 user agent strings flagged as robots in the database.
The decoy web page (trap file) feature is not currently used, so the detection procedure is essentially based on accesses to robots.txt, self-declared robots (in the user agent string) and all IP addresses and user agent strings previously determined to be robots. The date limit also is not used, so downloads from all flagged IP addresses are removed from the totals from the earliest date.
Outside the robot detection script a number of indicators are browsed monthly including the most downloaded items, the top twenty most frequent IP addresses (not already flagged as robots), and the daily download rate for the previous month. Any notable spikes (outliers) are investigated by checking the logs and performing a reverse DNS name lookup on the IP address. Figure 2 shows an example of an outlier that would warrant investigation. Quite often, a number of "badly behaved" robots are found this way each month. This technique is very similar to that described by Lamothe (2014) . Through a combination of the automatic robot detection script and manual intervention including reverse DNS name lookup, rate, volume, and interval between downloads, the robot detection technique used at UCD takes into account up to nine of the 17 elements listed in table 3.
Study method
The majority of studies reviewed were based on session data for the identification of robot sessions (AlNoamany et al., 2013 , Duskin and Feitelson, 2009 , Geens et al., 2006 , Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009 , Tan and Kumar, 2002 , Zabihi et al., 2014 . As mentioned, in our experience IRs typically have little or no real session data, instead usage is mostly limited to once-off file downloads directly from search engines. For this reason, rather than group downloads into sessions, we manually label a simple random sample of individual downloads to determine the recall and precision of the robot detection technique in use at UCD.
Two previous studies were quite similar to this study in that they were not based on session data. Huntington et al. (2008) tested a technique for an Open Access journal, a system and environment that is very similar to Open Access IRs. However, the purpose of the study was to measure the impact of robot usage on the journal rather than to propose or benchmark new detection techniques. Song et al. (2013) investigated click-fraud on advertisements appearing on multiple websites to whose logs the authors had no access. Thus the data they analysed was limited almost exclusively to IP address, user agent, and click behaviour and did not include session data as would be created when browsing a website. Behavioural indicators included the total number of clicked ads (malicious users often have dense clicks on one advertiser), average clicks per advertiser (trusted users show high diversity), and total clicks per IP address among others. We adapted these indicators to our study in addition to a number of standard indicators as found in the literature. Table 4 describes these data elements. At the time the data was taken for the current study, the main download table in the UCD IR's database contained close to four million downloads. The Minho statistics package calculates a "relative value" for downloads of multi-file items by dividing each download by the total number of bitstreams attached to the item. For example, a journal article could be uploaded as two separate PDFs in one item: full text in one PDF and figures in a second PDF. A download of either PDF is counted as 1 download / 2 bitstreams, for a relative value of 0.5 downloads. There are currently 39 items (less than 1%) with more than one bitstream in the UCD repository. For the purposes of this study, we ignore the relative value and consider a download of a single bitstream to be one full download.
A period of 24 months (2013-11-09 to 2015-11-08) was chosen to focus the study, bringing the total downloads to N = 3,344,219. Using an error of estimation bound B = 0.05 (for 95% certainty) and an estimated ratio of robots to total downloads p = 0.692896, we determined that n = 341 downloads constitutes a representative sample for simple random sampling (Sheaffer et al., 2006) . The p value was estimated by dividing the total number of robots flagged by the robot detection procedures by the total number of downloads since recording began in 2009. This produced a more conservative p value, '2013-11-09' and '2015-11-08 ' order by random() limit 341;
The data elements in Table 4 were captured for each download using a combination of SQL queries, Bash scripts and regular expressions (see Appendix 1).
To label each download, the flagged field was concealed from view and four passes were taken through the data. Self-declared robots were marked in the first pass. Reverse DNS lookup was performed on the remaining IP addresses in the second pass, where unambiguously robotic behaviour originating from hosting companies, cloud servers and search engine companies were labelled robots. In the third pass, the sessions created by IP addresses exhibiting ambiguous behaviour were examined in the log files and the IP addresses checked against the Project Honeypot database (Unspam Technologies Inc., 2015) . At this point, all downloads had been labelled and were compared against the flagged field to determine true and false positives and true and false negatives. All false positives and true negatives were then checked against the Project Honeypot database and examined in the log files, completing the fourth and final pass.
A number of assumptions were made while labelling the downloads. First, that IP addresses originating from search engine companies are always robots. This could potentially rule out genuine downloads made by employees of the company.
IP addresses originating from cloud, rack space, IT infrastructure and/or hosting companies were generally assumed to be from robotic agents. This raises a number of problems such as proxy servers, VPN users, cloud-hosted Ethernet users, and outsourced IT infrastructures. In general the download behaviour of these agents was sufficiently indicative, but in a many cases detailed log analysis, web search on agent/IP address pairs, and checking against Project Honeypot was required to make a final decision.
Lastly, it was assumed that downloads originating from end-user oriented ISPs are typically from human users. This was occasionally overridden by abnormal download behaviour, for example a download from an end-user IP address provided by a major Irish ISP, with a user agent string Mozilla Despite the assumptions, we endeavored to examine the data for each download holistically and in many cases our assumptions were overridden.
Results
Of the 341 random downloads between 9 November 2013 and 8 November 2015, 292 (85.63%) were determined to be robots based on detailed manual checking. This finding is consistent with a report commissioned by IRUS-UK which found a minimum of 85% of downloads to be from robots (Information Power Ltd., 2013) . IRUS-UK had approximately 20 participating institutional repositories at the time the data for their study was taken . Amending the robots/total downloads proportion using this ratio for the p value gives an error of estimation bound B = 0.0380, or 96.20% certainty (Sheaffer et al., 2006) .
The first manual pass through the data produced 242 robots (82.88% of the total robots found, 70.97% of all downloads) that self-identified in their user agent string. 40 robots (13.70% of all robots, 11.73% of all downloads) were determined through a combination of origin, user agent string and behaviour in the second pass.
The status of 11 downloads was ambiguous after the first two passes. Seven came from hosting companies. One download was removed from the dataset due to lack of data and replaced with a new random download from the period (without replacement of the previous 341 downloads). Of the remaining ten ambiguous downloads, eight were found to be robots through detailed log analysis, evidence from Project Honeypot, and Web searching on the IP addresses, agents, and DNS name.
Checking false positives and true negatives (downloads where manual labelling could have missed a robot) against Project Honeypot resulted in five new robot downloads being identified. However, six IP addresses flagged by Project Honeypot as potential comment spammers were ruled out and were not labelled as robots. 
Discussion
The unexpectedly high recall and precision measured here may be in part due to the fact that the ratio of robots to humans is very high. Doran and Gokhale (2011) put forward a theory that may go some way in explaining this high ratio when they describe Huntington et al.'s study on a scholarly OA journal (2008). They suggest that "[t]he percentage of robots at this site may be high because only a small number of human users are interested in visiting an online scientific journal, whereas archival or scholarly article search services will commonly employ robots to visit the journal frequently to index or archive new articles" (Doran and Gokhale, 2011) ) (p. 191). The percentage of downloads coming from robots in Huntington et al. is 32.6% (approximately 1:2 robots to humans), whereas the percentage at UCD is 85.63% (approximately 6:1 robots to humans).
Whatever the case may be, the downloads in this dataset are dominated by one robot in particular: Googlebot accounts for 165 of the 341 downloads, a massive 48%. To determine whether this is typical of repositories in particular or of web traffic in general would require further study. Treating Googlebot as an outlier and removing its downloads from the data, the recall, precision, and F-score are still encouraging at 0.8661, 0.9735, and 0.9167 respectively, with an error of estimation bound B = .0528 for 94.71% certainty (n = 176). This is still within the range of the detection studies reviewed here.
Neither recall, precision, nor by extension the F-score, take into account the number of true negatives captured by a system (Powers, 2011) . Since the studies in our review focused exclusively on robot detection and did not report true negatives, there is no way to compare the effectiveness of the system in our study with previous studies in terms of the accuracy of human usage. With this caveat in mind, the inverse recall, precision and F-score in the present study are 0.9388, 0.7302, and 0.8214 respectively.
The ratio of robots to humans visiting a site determines the relationship between robot detection recall and precision and the precision of reported human downloads (inverse precision; see Appendix 2). Since the robot to human ratio is very high in our data, an increase of 0.01 in robot recall at the current precision would improve the precision of reported human downloads (inverse precision) by 0.03. Increasing robot recall by 0.05 would improve human download precision by 0.22. If the robot:human ratio of 85% is generalizable, as the findings here and by IRUS-UK would suggest (Information Power Ltd., 2013), small improvements in any OA IR's robot detection could have significant effects on the precision and veracity of their usage statistics. Conversely, robot detection techniques that do not evolve with the advancement of web robots will result in usage statistics whose accuracy diminishes exponentially over time.
This study offers some findings towards the question of the DHCP problem. At 0.88%, even the total number of false positives is very low, suggesting that permanently blacklisting an IP address (even if it could be reassigned to a human user at a later date) is not a major problem. The trade-off in precision is likely insignificant in comparison to the increase in recall.
Finally, this benchmarking study shows that a low cost and practical robot detection technique can produce remarkably high robot recall and precision. The technique consists of an extendable list of known IP addresses and user agent strings garnered from robots.txt accesses via an automated process. This is coupled with a simple way to visually locate unusual behavior (outliers), allowing for manual robot detection.
Manual outlier checking, performed monthly at UCD, increases robot recall by 0.05; this in turn improves the reported human download precision by 0.14. Currently, neither DSpace nor EPrints support the ability to manually check for outliers. Adding this capability and/or the robots.txt/trap file feature, common to many studies and the Minho system, could significantly improve the accuracy of these systems' usage statistics.
While there is some evidence to suggest that the finding of 85% robot downloads is generalizable for OA repositories, this study alone cannot make broad conclusions as to the accuracy of web robot detection in IRs. The study is performed on only one repository that uses a single, somewhat idiosyncratic web robot detection technique. Search engine optimization and crawl behaviour influences (e.g. differing use of robots.txt, use or non-use of sitemaps.xml files) will likely change the effects of robots on repositories' usage statistics. Future studies adding to the breadth of empirical data, or larger studies across multiple sites and platforms can improve on these limitations.
Conclusion
Web robot detection is most successful when a variety of data and techniques are combined to achieve a best-possible result; no technique or combination of techniques will produce usage statistics that are completely free of robot downloads. This study has shown that very accurate robot detection at low cost in terms of computing resources and staff time is possible in community developed, free open source OA institutional repository systems. This is the first web robot detection benchmarking study performed on a scholarly OA institutional repository to be reported. It differs from previous benchmarking studies in that the majority are experimental methods and do not test an operational robot detection technique, with the only exception being Lamothe (2014) .
Given the high proportion of robot downloads being made in OA institutional repositories, small improvements in robot detection increase the precision and veracity of reported usage statistics exponentially. It is well worth the effort in order to demonstrate the value of these services in a more transparent and trustworthy manner. ratio of robots to total downloads 9. Factor out Fn from 8.:
This function shows primarily the effect that increasing or decreasing robot recall (at a given precision and ratio of robot downloads) has on the precision of human download counts. It could also be used to determine the inverse precision of a benchmarking study that reports R, P and T.
